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Abstract
This research explores the influence of foreign ownership on non-financial public 
shareholding firms in the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The study involved an in-
vestigation into the connection between non-Jordanian ownership and the company 
growth opportunity, stock liquidity, leverage, dividend policy and business output. The 
results highlight that foreign ownership can provide improved corporate governance 
practices by playing a decisive role in increasing the growth opportunity and enhanc-
ing the firms’ market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Moreover, the findings in-
dicate that companies with foreign board membership have better operating perfor-
mance and higher firm value. The rewards were reaped by foreign investors based on 
their superior monitoring ability, which affects the decisions made and actions taken 
by management.
Rawan Shubita (Jordan), Moade Fawzi Shubita (United Kingdom)
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INTRODUCTION
Foreign ownership is one of the vital issues to be investigated exten-
sively in accounting and finance literature. Several studies suggest that 
foreign ownership is critical in enhancing and developing corporate 
governance due to the ability of foreign shareholders to monitor man-
agerial actions as part of an internal corporate governance mechanism 
(Douma et al., 2006; Rhee & Wang, 2009, among others).
However, there are mixed results regarding the role of foreign owner-
ship in emerging markets. On the one hand, Li et al. (2011) highlight 
that the emerging stock markets can benefit from the monitoring role 
played by foreign investors, while Baek et al. (2004) demonstrate that 
businesses with a greater level of foreign ownership suffer less and ob-
serve a lower fall rate in the value of their shares. Conversely, Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000) suggest that granting foreign investors access to 
the market may lead to the increased valuation of local companies, 
which introduce higher stock return volatility. Phung and Vy Le (2013) 
reveal that a monitoring role is not played if the degree of foreign own-
ership is not sufficiently concentrated.
Thus, this study’s primary goal is to explore the financial aspect of 
corporate governance by examining whether the existence of foreign 
ownership in publicly-trading non-financial firms in the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) can provide better corporate governance at the 
firm level. Further, the potential impact of foreign membership of the 
board is also explored. The analysis is performed by exploring the na-
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ture of the relationship between foreign ownership and different indicators of the firm characteristics 
related to good governance practice. Moreover, the potential impact of the monitoring role will be ad-
dressed based on the same independent variables of the foreign ownership model.
This study aims to achieve two objectives. First, it will test empirically whether foreign ownership leads 
to attaining better corporate governance. It will achieve this by investigating the relationship between 
foreign ownership and the characteristics of a well-governed firm. This objective involves exploring sep-
arately the relationship between foreign ownership as an independent variable and five dependent var-
iables. The dependent variables are turnover ratio as a measure of the stock market liquidity, Tobin’s Q, 
which measures firm value, leverage ratio as a measure of the availability of external finance, dividend 
yield as a measure of dividend payment, and return on assets to assess a firm’s performance. Second, the 
study will test empirically the possibility of providing a monitoring role to foreign investors as board 
members. As with the first objective, this will be achieved by replacing foreign ownership with foreign 
board membership as a dependent dummy variable. Thus, the primary research question of the study 
is to assess the impact of the foreign investment and foreign board membership on various dimensions 
of company performance.
This paper is structured as follows: section one outlines the literature review. Section two presents the 
methodology of the study, which includes variable measurement and the hypotheses. Section three 
presents and discusses the findings, and final section presents the conclusion and direction for future 
studies.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies attempt to examine the potential 
link between the existence of foreign ownership 
and firm characteristics, which are proven to re-
late better to corporate governance quality. Kang 
and Stulz (1997) explore the impact of the exist-
ence of foreign ownership in Japanese firms be-
tween 1975 and 1991. The models for this study 
were constructed based on the following charac-
teristics: return on assets; book-to-market ratio; 
market value; current ratio; beta; excess return; 
leverage; and residual variance. Using the multi-
ple regressions method, Kang and Stulz’s (1997) 
primary findings indicate that firms with for-
eign ownership perform better at the operational 
level, and larger in size and have lower leverage. 
Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) have expanded 
on Kang and Stulz (1997) by investigating the po-
tential impact of foreign ownership on Swedish 
firms for the period 1993–1997. They added div-
idend yield as a measure of dividend payment to 
the same firm-specific attributes explored in Kang 
and Stulz (1997). This study’s results highlight 
that foreign ownership relates positively to both 
firm size, as measured by market capitalization, 
and a significant amount of cash, as measured by 
the current ratio. Conversely, the study outlines 
the negative impact of foreign ownership on the 
amount of dividend payment, measured by divi-
dend yield. Chiang and Kuo (2006) characterized 
foreign ownership on the Taiwan stock market 
by utilizing the same firm characteristics used in 
both earlier studies. Their results are consistent 
with previous studies in demonstrating the pos-
itive association between foreign ownership and 
firm performance, and the negative association 
with firm leverage.
The empirical evidence for the impact of foreign 
ownership and the stock market liquidity yield 
mixed results. On a positive note, a study con-
ducted by Bekaert et al. (2003) highlights the pos-
itive effect of foreign ownership on stock market 
liquidity. The rationale for this argument assumes 
that, in emerging markets, the existence of for-
eign ownership can reduce the level of informa-
tion asymmetry and increase the trading activity 
and quality of information disclosure. Conversely, 
other studies challenge this positive argument and 
claim that foreign ownership impacts negatively 
on stock market liquidity for two essential rea-
sons. First, the foreign investors apply a buy and 
hold strategy that reduces the amount of trading 
frequency and impacts negatively on stock mar-
ket liquidity. Second, foreign ownership induces 
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a higher level of information asymmetry between 
foreign and local investors, which implies an ad-
verse effect on stock market liquidity (Wang, 2007; 
Rhee & Wang, 2009; Umutlu et al., 2013; Vo, 2016). 
Furthermore, from a legal perspective, in an at-
tempt to explain the rationale of the counter view, 
Lesmond (2005) and Amihud (2002) argue that 
emerging markets with weak investor’s protection 
law, such as Jordan, have higher liquidity costs and 
lower stock market liquidity compared with devel-
oped markets.
The relationship between foreign board member-
ship and firm performance is also discussed in the 
literature. According to previous research, there 
are two different arguments regarding the im-
pact of foreign ownership on firm performance. 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2002) analyze the effect of 
the presence of outside (Anglo-American) board 
members on firm performance using firm value 
as a proxy for firm value. Their results indicate 
that firms with foreign board members are val-
ued significantly higher than other companies. 
Moreover, further investigation within the same 
study demonstrates that Tobin’s Q is considera-
bly higher for older firms and those with a higher 
level of market capitalization. Meanwhile, Wei et 
al. (2005) analyze the link between three types of 
ownership structure (state, institutional and for-
eign) with the firm value measured using Tobin’s 
Q and rely on a large sample of firms trading in 
China’s stock exchanges. The purpose of this was 
to explore how the conflict of interest across dif-
ferent types of equity owners affects the firm val-
ue. They found that foreign ownership had a signif-
icantly positive effect on firm value. The findings 
suggest that shares owned by foreign investor cre-
ate value through their monitoring role. 
Douma et al. (2006) address the influence of for-
eign investment as a different approach. They dif-
ferentiate between the effects of the foreign in-
stitutional and foreign corporate shareholders 
on the performance of developing equity market 
firms. The results reveal that foreign firms per-
form better than domestic companies concern-
ing return on assets and Tobin’s Q ratios. They 
also demonstrate that foreign shareholders mon-
itor the firm’s internal corporate governance 
system. Conversely, based on Vietnamese data, 
Phung and Vy Le (2013) find that foreign own-
ership impacts negatively on firm performance. 
Such results contradict the trend of the clear ma-
jority of other studies; their findings show that 
for developing markets, such as Vietnam in this 
case, foreign ownership is not a significant factor 
in the monitoring of  corporate governance. This 
is especially the case when it is diluted. However, 
Agarwal et al. (2009) reveal that foreign inves-
tors perform less well than domestic investors 
due to their aggressive approach to trading. This 
study is based on the Indonesian market. While, 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) found that foreign institutional participa-
tion enhances Tobin’s Q, firm valuation and cor-
porate governance practices in domestic firms; 
however, their date was not based on emerging 
markets. With regard to impact, based on da-
ta gathered from emerging markets, Richards 
(2005) demonstrates the greater impact of for-
eign investors on market returns, compared with 
domestic investors. Likewise, using data gath-
ered from 30 countries between 2000 and 2010, 
Bena et al.’s (2017) study finds that institutional 
foreign investors have a long-term version and 
motivate innovation.
The leverage ratio is used in various studies as an 
indicator for external finance to explore the type 
of relationship that may exist between foreign 
ownership and the availability of external funding. 
The general perception is that foreign ownership 
impacts negatively on leverage. This argument is 
drawn from the preference of foreign investors to 
avoid any possibility of financial distress, as for-
eign ownership prefers firms with low leverage 
(Chiang & Kuo, 2006). However, Phung and Vy 
Le (2013) present a counterpoint view, whereby 
foreign investors suffer from asymmetric infor-
mation and tend to increase debt to mitigate the 
problem of agency. In light of the counter-argu-
ment, we claim that firms with the greatest need 
for external finance must adopt better corporate 
governance mechanisms in the future (LaPorta 
et al., 1998). Thus, linking this factor with foreign 
ownership and foreign board membership will 
be significant and positive, as the study’s data are 
based on the Jordanian market, which is a devel-
oping country.
The general trend observed in recent literature 
supports the contrary effect argument of for-
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eign ownership on the amount of dividend pay-
ment. Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) indicate 
that foreign investors prefer to invest in firms 
that distribute a lower amount of earnings. The 
principal justification for this adverse relation is 
based on the tax advantage, which foreign inves-
tors may face as a result of the tradeoff decision 
between dividend and capital gain; in particular, 
foreign investors use a long-term holding strategy 
(Chiang & Kuo, 2006).
Based on the general arguments that firm size is 
a proxy for firm recognition and the level of in-
formation asymmetries, numerous studies indi-
cate a strong positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm size (for example, Dahlquist 
& Robertson, 2001).
Oxelheim and Randøy (2002) reveal a positive rela-
tionship between foreign ownership and firm age; 
they argue that the impact of foreign ownership 
monitoring is higher in older firms than those es-
tablished more recently. The reason for this is that 
old firms have more free cash flow; therefore, they 
require greater levels of monitoring and control. 
Thus, the adoption of good corporate governance 
is essential in older firms.
Building on the earlier discussion of previous 
studies and since Jordan was ranked 118th out 
of 190 countries according to ease of doing busi-
ness (World Bank, 2017), Jordan had been at this 
rank for some time (World Bank, 2013–2017). 
According to this position, about two-thirds of 
the world scores a higher ranking than Jordan 
concerning ‘ease of doing business’. Consequently, 
Jordan is ranked relatively low regarding investor 
protection compared with most of the world.
In countries with weak investor’s protection law, 
such as Jordan, the importance of adopting sound 
corporate governance practice is more relevant 
(LaPorta et al., 1998). Thus, the significance of this 
study arises from identifying the potential ben-
efit of the monitoring role that foreign investors 
may provide. Furthermore, addressing the impact 
of foreign ownership on the characteristics of a 
well-governed firm may enhance the quality of 
corporate governance practice. This study expects 
to establish a base for further studies in Jordan 
and the wider region.
The London initiatives (2019), which is an interna-
tional gathering of politicians, economists, and in-
vestors took place in London, was held on February 
28, 2019 to establish a relationship between Jordan 
and the international community. Here, most of 
the time was devoted to promoting Jordan for for-
eign investment. In addition to the literature re-
view and Jordan’s low ease of doing business rank-
ing, this event demonstrates the value relevance of 
conducting this study. The outcomes are expected 
to contribute to the knowledge, as potential inves-
tors will have a better understanding of the poten-
tial outcomes of the investment. Meanwhile, it ex-
pects to have an impact on practice based on the 
empirical findings of the study. Such results are 
important for both Jordan and the international 
community.
2. METHODOLOGY  
OF THE STUDY
Based on the earlier discussion in section 1, this 
section discusses the study’s methodology. The 
study will adopt quantitative analysis tools based 
on positive accounting theory. The capital market 
is assumed to be efficient in the semi-strong form, 
where share prices are assumed to be unbiased in-
dicator of the company performance. The meth-
odology will include various modelling to help test 
the hypotheses of the study, which are informed 
by the literature review.
The subsections of the methodology section in-
clude variable measurement, models of study, 
study hypotheses, population and sample of the 
study, and period of the study.
2.1. Variable measurement
Following the discussion in the literature review 
section, this subsection will present the variables 
of the study divided into dependent, independent 
and control variables along with an explanation of 
the proxy of each variable. 
2.1.1. Dependent variables
Following Kang and Stulz (1997), and Dahlquist 
and Robertson (2001), the dependent variables of 
this study comprise five firm characteristics.
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First: Stock market liquidity; turnover ratio (TR)
Different measures can be used to estimate the 
stock liquidity; the common proxy is the turnover 
ratio (TR). This is a volume-based liquidity esti-
mator that reflects trading frequency in the stock 
market (Lesmond, 2005, Chiang & Kuo, 2006, 
Dahlquist & Robertson, 2001, among others).
,
V
TR Average
N
 =     (1)
where TR – turnover ratio, V – daily trading vol-
ume, N – number of outstanding shares. 
Second: Firm value; Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ)
Several studies used Tobin’s Q (TQ) ratio as a 
proxy measure for firm market valuation. Based 
on Wei et al. (2005), Oxelheim and Randøy (2002) 
and Cho (1998), we will use TQ ratio as a proxy 
for the firm value based on the following formula:
( )
,
MVE TL
TQ
TA
+=  (2)
where TQ – Tobin’s Q ratio, MVE – market value 
of equity, TL – total liability, TA – total asset.
Third: External financing; leverage ratio (LEV)
Following Chiang and Kuo (2006), leverage ratio 
(LEV) will be used as a proxy to indicate the long-
term financial distress and measures the ability of 
the firms to meet their long-term financial obliga-
tions. LEV will be calculated using the following 
formula:
,
TL
LEV
TA
=  (3)
where LEV – leverage ratio, TL – total liability, TA – 
total asset.
Fourth: Firm performance; return on assets (ROA) 
Return on assets is one of the fundamental per-
formance measures that reflect the firm’s operat-
ing performance (Chiang & Kuo, 2006). Return 
on assets is defined as net income over total assets 
(Klapper & Love, 2004) as follows:
,
NI
ROA
TA
=  (4)
where ROA – return on asset, NI – net income, TA – 
total asset.
Fifth: Dividend payment
Dividend yield is defined as the value of the yearly 
dividend payment relative to the firm’s market val-
ue (Chiang & Kuo, 2006; Dahlquist & Robertson, 
2001) as follows:
,
DIV
DY
MV
=  (5)
where DY – dividend yield, DIV – yearly dividend 
payment, MV – market value of firm.
2.1.2. Independent variables
A. We measure foreign ownership in our study as 
the percentage of common shares owned by 
non-Jordanian investors (Arab and foreign).
B. Foreign board member: This is a dummy var-
iable equal to one if the non-Jordanian in-
vestors (Arab and foreign) are serving on the 
board of directors, and zero otherwise.
2.1.3. Control variables
To enhance the model specification and capture 
additional relevant information in line with the 
discussion in section 2, two control variables are 
added, namely firm size and firm age. Each varia-
ble is measured and discussed in detail.
Firm size
Firm size is considered a control variable measured 
according to the total assets; the firm size equals 
the natural log of the book value of total assets. The 
inclusion of this variable is anticipated to enhance 
the model specification and mitigates the impact of 
heteroscedasticity (Chiang & Kuo, 2006). Further, 
including this variable helps reduce bias as it is ex-
pected that larger firms are better able to cope with 
sudden liquidity shortfalls and hope to have better 
access for investment in capital markets. Moreover, 
more prominent companies have enhanced re-
sources to diversify risk (Demstez & Strahan, 1997). 
Thus, to enhance the model specification and pre-
vent results being driven by size, firm size is consid-
ered a control variable within the model.
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Firm age
The second control variable is firm age, which is 
based on the year of establishment. The ration-
ale for its inclusion is largely the same as for firm 
size. Following Oxelheim and Randøy (2002), we 
calculated firm age by counting the number of 
years since establishment, then taking its natural 
logarithm.
2.2. Models of the study
This study will use the two models detailed as 
follows:  
A. The first model examines the potential impact 
of foreign ownership on the firm characteris-
tics, as addressed in subsection 3.1:
0 1
2 3 ,
it it
it it it
Y FO
Size Age
= + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
β β
β β ε  (6)
where Y
it
 is the dependent variable and stand 
as one of the firm characteristics, as outlined in 
equations 1-5; FO – foreign ownership; Size – firm 
size; Age – firm age; β
0
 – intercept; β
1
, β
2
 and β
3
 – 
coefficients of the independent variables, ε – error 
term, i – firm, t – number of years.
B. The second model tests the potential impact 
of foreign board members by replacing it with 
the foreign ownership in equation 6 to gener-
ate equation 7 as follows (all other details re-
main the same):
0 1
2 3 ,
it
it it it
Y FBM
Size Age
= + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
β β
β β ε  (7)
where FBM – foreign board member, all other de-
tails are similar to equation 6.
2.3. Study hypotheses
Section 1 presents studies that are relevant to the 
current research; the overall discussion in the 
literature review section provides a rationale for 
the study hypotheses. Following the rationale 
discussed in section 2, the following hypotheses 
are formulated in the alternative form Ha:
2.3.1. First model, equation 6
Hypotheses from 1 to 5 address the potential im-
pact of foreign ownership on various ratios:
H1: There is a positive relationship between for-
eign ownership and Tobin’s Q.
H2: There is a negative relationship between for-
eign ownership and leverage ratio.
H3: There is a positive relationship between for-
eign ownership and return on assets.
H4: There is a negative relationship between for-
eign ownership and turnover ratio.
H5: There is a negative relationship between for-
eign ownership and dividend yield.
2.3.2. Second model, equation 7
Hypotheses from 1 to 5 address the potential im-
pact of foreign board members on various ratios:
H1: There is a positive relationship between for-
eign board members and Tobin’s Q.
H2: There is a negative relationship between for-
eign board members and leverage ratio.
H3: There is a positive relationship between for-
eign board members and return on assets.
H4: There is a negative relationship between for-
eign board members and turnover ratio.
H5: There is a negative relationship between for-
eign board members and dividend yield.
2.4. Population and sample  
of the study
The study population consists of non-financial 
companies (industrial and service) that traded ac-
tively in the ASE for the duration of the study peri-
od (2000–2008). Firms in the financial and insur-
ance sectors were excluded to maintain harmony. 
There were 145 non-financial companies listed in 
the ASE at the end of 2008 (88 from the industry 
sector, representing 60% of the population, and 56 
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from the service sector, representing 40% of the 
population). This dataset will be the starting point 
for the study; the study sample comprises the com-
panies that remain once the following criteria are 
applied:
1. The foreign ownership exists at least for one 
during the period of the study.
2. The company must have active shares and sta-
tus as a public shareholder company. Therefore, 
the company status must not be delisted, sus-
pended or liquidated.
3. The company must be established before 2004; 
this ensures that sufficient data are available 
for each company.
4. Each company must have at least five consecu-
tive years of valid data. 
All non-financial public shareholder companies 
that satisfy the above conditions are included in 
the study sample. 35 companies, 24% of the popu-
lation, did not meet at least one of the four condi-
tions and are, therefore, excluded from the study. 
The study sample includes 110 companies, all of 
which satisfy all conditions generating 982 com-
pany-year observations. 
The sample distribution represents almost 76% of 
the population: 46 companies from the service 
sector (42% from the sample); and 64 companies 
from the industry sector (58% from the sample). 
More details about the companies included in the 
study sample are available upon request.
2.5. Period of the study
The required data for the study will be collected 
using the Public Shareholder Companies’ guide 
issued by the ASE. The data are publicly available 
via a database on the official ASE website: www.
ase.com.jo. The study data include financial data 
extracted from financial statements of all non-fi-
nancial shareholder companies that trade active-
ly in the ASE, providing all the necessary data 
for calculating the study variables. Other types of 
data are also included, such as the percentage of 
shares owned by foreign investors and the board 
of directors.
The study will cover nine years from 2000 to 2008. 
This period represents the best available alterna-
tive due to the lack of detailed information about 
ownership structure after 2008. There is no more 
detailed disclosure of this information after this 
year by the ASE. Moreover, this period will help 
avoid the noise of financial crises on the vari-
ables of the study and will lead to more reliable 
results. The Arab Spring that invaded the region 
shortly after the economic crisis and created un-
rest in many countries along with the rise of so-
called ISIS made extending the period very diffi-
cult. Controlling all these external factors was not 
possible, and the noise they created would lead to 
an increase in the misspecification of the models. 
On a positive note, this is the very first study con-
ducted in Jordan; its outcomes will form a base for 
future studies in Jordan and the wider region.
3. RESULTS  
AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Introduction
Several statistical tools are used in this study, and 
the analysis of the results will be presented over 
various steps. As a start point, descriptive analy-
sis has been used to describe the data required for 
this research. Then, correlation factors will be pre-
sented to explain the association among variables 
of the study. The regression models are running in 
non-nested fashion in two forms: ordinarily and 
fixed effect regression. The least square multiple 
regressions are used to test the study hypotheses 
while controlling other characteristics (fir size 
and firm age). Whereas, the fixed effect regression 
was used to control the effect of unobserved firm 
characteristics that may be correlated with the ob-
served independent variables. The hypotheses of 
the study will be examined based on regression 
models.
3.2. Descriptive analysis
Panel A presents the statistical summary of study 
variables. The descriptive indicators are based 
on mean, median, and standard deviation (SD). 
Further, we presented minimum and maximum 
values for each variable to show reader range of 
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each variable. The results presented in Table 1 re-
veal that the overall mean of the foreign investors, 
the percentage of shares owned by foreign inves-
tors, has a mean of 14%, while the median fell to 
only 5% with a standard deviation equal to 20.5%. 
The median value of foreign ownership (FO) is 
much lower than the mean value due to the high 
variation of foreign ownership, which varies be-
tween 0 and 100%. 
The mean (median) of the turnover ratio (TR) is 
0.8% (0.2%), the value of TR varies from zero to 
24%, standard deviation of TR is equal to 20.5%. 
Regarding TQ, the mean (median) value is 1.878 
(1.07). It has a minimum amount of 0.01, a max-
imum value of 4.56 and SD is equal to 0.744. 
Comparing TQ figures in Jordan with other coun-
tries demonstrates that the market valuation of the 
firms in Jordan is relatively lower than the rest of 
the world, the global average is 2.09 (1.39), with SD 
of 1.68 (Klapper & Love, 2004). Klapper and Love 
(2004) also present figures for other countries: the 
TQ mean (median) value is 1.16 (1.16) in Turkey, 
2.82 (1.66) in India, 1.84 (1.45) in Malaysia, 1.90 
(1.37) in South Africa, and 3.67 (3.12) in Taiwan.
The descriptive summary highlights the reliance 
of firms on an external source of funds (liabilities), 
which are 24% with SD being equal to 21.1%; the 
LEV of listed firms is spread widely from 0% to 89%.
Return on assets (ROA) is a proxy for firm per-
formance. It has a mean (median) of 2.9% (3%) 
and a SD of 8.6%. Further, it has a minimum 
value of –46% and a maximum value of 43%; 
the high spread between the minimum and the 
maximum amount is attributed to the high var-
iability in firms’ earnings during the study peri-
od. Comparing ROA in Jordan with other coun-
tries reveals again that ROA for firms in Jordan 
is relatively lower than for the rest of the world; 
the mean (SD) is 5% (8%) in Turkey, 11% (8%) in 
India, 10% (8%) in Malaysia, 9% (7%) in South 
Africa, and 10% (7%) in Taiwan, while the over-
all average for the world is 8% (16%) (Klapper & 
Love, 2004).
The dividend yield (DY) has a mean (median) of 
2.2% (0) with SD of 3.7%. Regarding the control 
variable, firm size has a mean of 15.254 and SD of 
4.577, while firm age has a mean of 2.452 and SD 
of 1.066. 
Foreign board member (FBM) is measured 
via a dummy variable; 1 if the foreign inves-
tors are serving on the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Unreported results reveal that slightly more than 
one-third of the firms’ observations in Jordan 
have FBMs. This dummy variable will be used 
in the second model to capture the foreign mem-
ber(s) of the board.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the entire sample
Variable
Foreign ownership Turnover ratio Tobin’s Q ratio Leverage ratio Dividend yield Return on assets Firm age Firm size
Mean 0.14 0.008 1.878 0.27 0.022 0.029 2.452 15.254
Median 0.05 0.002 1.07 0.24 0.00 0.03 2.48 16.29
SD 0.205 0.018 0.744 0.211 0.037 0.086 1.066 4.577
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0 –0.46 0.69 13.1
Maximum 1.00 0.24 4.56 0.89 0.43 0.43 7.60 20.59
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for firms where foreign ownership (FO) is greater than 5%
Mean 0.274 0.008 1.30 0.30 0.02 0.03 2.68 16.56
Median 0.189 0.002 1.17 0.28 0 0.03 2.64 16.54
SD 0.227 0.014 0.66 0.20 0.04 0.09 0.86 2.04
Minimum 0.056 0 0.01 0.01 0 –0.46 .69 13.74
Maximum 1 0.134 3.90 0.89 0.43 0.43 4.25 20.31
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for firm where foreign ownership (FO) is lower than 5%
Mean 0.014 0.008 1.08 0.24 0.02 0.03 2.23 14.02
Median 0.007 0.002 1.01 0.19 0.00 0.02 2.40 15.99
SD 0.016 0.021 0.80 0.22 0.04 0.09 1.19 5.80
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 –0.46 0.69 13.10
Maximum 0.05 0.24 4.56 0.88 0.35 0.34 7.60 20.59
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistic for the study variables.
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Table 2. Frequencies of firms of the study 
according to foreign ownership percentage
Foreign ownership Observation Percentage
0% 235 23.93%
1%_ ≤ 5% 271 27.60%
> 5 _≤ 10% 104 10.59%
> 10 _≤ 20% 146 14.87%
> 20 _≤ 40% 111 11.30%
More than 40% 115 11.71%
Total 982 100.00%
Table 2 outlines the number and percentage of 
firms with foreign ownership; these data were hand 
collected from annual reports of each firm. Table 
2 demonstrates that 23.93% of the study obser-
vations have zero foreign ownership. Conversely, 
23.01% of the observations have more than 20% of 
shares owned by foreign investors, of which 11.7% 
of firms’ foreign investors held more than 40%. 
Therefore, it is clear that the percentage of foreign 
ownership varies within the study sample. 
This table helps identify a proper cutoff point for 
further analysis. We have noticed that 5% is a suit-
able cutoff point, since 51.53% of the observations 
have foreign ownership of less than 5%, while 
48.47 % of the observations have more than 5% 
foreign ownership. These figures indicate that the 
5% almost divided the sample into two equal por-
tions, which made it as a proper cutoff point from 
the practice ASE around the period of the study 
used to regard the 5% as the cutoff point between 
significant and insignificant foreign ownership.
Panels A and B of Table 1 present the descrip-
tive measures for the variables of the study after 
dividing the sample based on foreign ownership 
percentages; 5% is used as the cutoff, as explained 
previously. The results demonstrate that leverage 
and TQ ratios are higher when more foreign own-
ership is involved, while size tends to be higher 
when foreign ownership is greater than 5%. The 
remaining figures are close despite the range be-
tween the maximum and minimum values being 
relatively smaller for companies with more than 
5% of foreign ownership. Further, the gap between 
mean and median declines for firms with foreign 
ownership levels is higher than 5%.
3.3. Correlation matrix analysis
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix of 
the study variables. The results presented in Table 
3 demonstrate that foreign ownership has a posi-
tive correlation with the firm’s value and leverage, 
whereby foreign ownership correlates positively 
with TQ by 20.1% and with LEV by 9% at 1% sig-
nificance level. Thus, correlation figures support 
the primary indicators presented in Table 1; thus, 
we conclude that an increase in foreign ownership 
is expected to have a positive impact on both firm 
value and leverage.
The highest positive correlation coefficient is be-
tween foreign ownership and foreign board mem-
bership (0.706 at 1% significance level), thereby in-
dicating that, in most cases, foreign investors that 
own common shares in Jordanian companies are 
also board members. The correlation between for-
eign ownership and firm size is 19.9%, while the 
figure is 22.4% between foreign board member-
Table 3. Correlation matrix
Variables
Foreign ownership Turnover ratio Tobin’s Q ratio Leverage ratio Dividend yield Return on assets Firm age Firm size
Foreign ownership 1
Turnover ratio –0.059 1
Tobin’s Q ratio 0.201** 0.141** 1
Leverage ratio 0.090** 0.077* 0.204** 1
Dividend yield –0.024 –0.014 0.128** –0.026 1
Return on assets 0.003 0.076* 0.323** –0.123** 0.267** 1
Firm age 0.151 –0.008 0.335** 0.180** 0.229** 0.100** 1
Firm size 0.199** 0.062 0.392** 0.341** 0.191** 0.111** 0.618** 1
Foreign board 
member
0.706** –0.077* 0.147** 0.127** –0.043 0.026 0.194** 0.224**
Note: This table presents correlation matrix for the study variables.
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ship and firm size, both figures are significant at 
1%. This indicates that foreign investors prefer to 
invest in larger firms, which coincides with the re-
sults presented in Panels B and C of Table 1. 
3.4. Regression analysis
This subsection presents and discusses the empir-
ical results of the study based on two versions of 
the regression analysis. The results for both ordi-
nary least square (OLS), multiple regression and 
fixed effect regression are presented in separate ta-
bles; separate models will be analyzed for each ap-
proach. The results of OLS multiple regression are 
reported in Panel A of Table 4, for the first mod-
el as presented in equation 6, and Panel B for the 
second model, as shown in equation 7. Whereas, 
Table 5 presents results based on the fixed effect 
regression model in panels A and B for first and 
second models, respectively. 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the output for regressing 
foreign ownership as an explanatory variable, along 
with firm size and firm age as the control variables 
against the five firm attributes outlined in subsec-
tion 3.1. Whereas, Panel B of Table 4 outlines the 
output for regressing foreign board membership as 
an explanatory variable along with the same control 
variables against the same firm attributes in Panel A.
The results presented in Panel A of Table 4 reveal 
that the foreign ownership coefficient has a nega-
tive association with TR and DY as dependent var-
iables; this relationship has a significance level of 
5%. Concerning the association between TQ and 
foreign ownership, the results demonstrate a pos-
itive and robust relationship with a significance 
level equal to 1%. The remaining firm attributes 
LEV and ROA yield insignificant results. 
In Panel B of Table 4, the results reveal that the 
foreign board membership coefficient has a neg-
ative association with TR and DY as depend-
ent variables; this relationship is significant and 
gains strength as the significance level reaches 1%. 
Regarding the association between TQ and FBM, 
the results reveal a positive relationship that is 
still significant at 10%; the significant level has de-
clined to 10%. Unlike the first model, the LEV coef-
ficient becomes positive and significant with FBM 
at 10% significance level. The remaining firms’ at-
tribute ROA yields insignificant results.
Table 4. Results based on ordinary least square (OLS) regression
Variables Turnover ratio Tobin’s Q ratio Leverage ratio Dividend yield Return on assets
Panel A: first model: 
0 1 2 3 ,it it it it itY FO Size Ageβ β β β ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
Dependent variables
Constant 0.005** 0.189*** 0.033 –0.003 –0.436***
Foreign ownership –0.006** 0.474*** 0.026 –0.012** –0.014***
Firm size 0.0005*** 0.071*** 0.017*** 0.001** 0.003***
Firm age –0.001* 0.051* –0.010 0.006*** 0.007***
Adj. R2 1.23% 17.95% 11.51% 5.68% 1.01%
F-statistics 4.07 72.45 43.51 20.68 4.67
Panel B: second model: 0 1 2 3 ,it it it it itY FBM Size Ageβ β β β ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
Dependent variables
Constant 0.005** 0.189*** 0.033 –0.003 –0.004
Foreign board member –0.003*** 0.081* 0.024* –0.008*** –0.0002
Firm size 0.0005*** 0.047*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 0.001**
Firm age –0.001* 0.101*** –0.011 0.006*** 0.004
Adj. R2 1.24% 16.77% 11.76% 6.20% 1.07%
F-statistics 5.09 66.83 44.53 22.58 4.53
Note: *** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed), ** significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), * significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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Panels A and B of Table 5 report the results of 
fixed effect regression for first and second mod-
els, respectively. This is achieved by running the 
model based on cross-sectional and time series 
regression. The time series regression result is re-
ported in Table 5, results from other versions, not 
reported, yield the same trend and are available 
upon request. 
The results presented in Panel A of Table 5 uncover 
a negative relationship between foreign ownership 
and TR, DY, which is significant at 1% and 10% 
level, respectively. Meanwhile, the relationship 
between foreign ownership and TQ is positively 
significant at 1%. Conversely, the relationship be-
tween foreign ownership and both LEV and ROA 
is insignificant.
The results presented in Panel B of Table 5 reveal 
that the relationship between foreign board mem-
bership and both TR and DY is significantly neg-
ative at 1% level. The relationship between foreign 
board membership and both TQ and LEV is pos-
itively significant at 10% level, while the relation-
ship between foreign board membership and ROA 
is insignificant.
3.5. Discussion of results
The following subsection compares the results of 
the study with other findings in the literature to 
provide an opportunity for further investigation. 
We will divide the discussion into the following 
subsections in accordance with the variables. 
3.5.1. Foreign ownership and firm performance: 
first and third hypotheses
This study used two traditional measures of per-
formance: TQ as a proxy of firm value and ROA 
as a proxy for operating performance. In the first 
model, the results indicate that the existence of 
foreign ownership enhances the firm’s value by in-
creasing the TQ ratio. Thus, we could accept the 
first hypothesis for the first model. This is con-
sistent with the outcomes of Wei et al. (2005) and 
Oxelheim and Randøy (2002). The result of the 
second model shows that the foreign board mem-
bership plays a monitoring role that induces a pos-
itive impact on firm value. Thus, this leads to ac-
cepting the first hypothesis of the second model. 
This result is also consistent with that of Oxelheim 
and Randøy (2002).
Table 5. Results based on fixed effect regression
Variables Turnover ratio Tobin’s Q ratio Leverage ratio Dividend yield Return on assets
Panel A: first model: 
0 1 2 3 ,it it it it itY FO Size Ageβ β β β ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
Dependent variables
Constant 0.007*** 0.317*** 0.039* –0.006 –5.670
Foreign ownership –0.008*** 0.375*** 0.023 –0.014* –0.010
Firm size 0.0004*** 0.042*** 0.017*** 0.001*** 0.001**
Firm age –0.001** 0.075*** –0.011 0.007*** 0.003
Adj. R2 3.54% 4.60% 11.02% 6.71% 2.64%
F-statistics 4.27*** 15.46*** 12.03*** 7.41*** 3.42
Panel B: second model: 
0 1 2 3 ,it it it it itY FBM Size Ageβ β β β ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +  
Dependent variables
Constant 0.007*** 0.322*** 0.039* –0.007 –0.0002
Foreign board member –0.004*** 0.073* 0.024* –0.007*** –0.0003
Firm size 0.0004*** 0.043*** 0.016*** 0.001*** 0.001*
Firm age –0.001** 0.075*** –0.012 0.007*** 0.003
Adj. R2 3.69% 23.62% 11.27% 7.29% 2.58%
F-statistics 4.42 28.55 12.32 8.01 3.36
Note: *** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed), ** significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), * significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
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The results of our study demonstrate that the re-
lationship between foreign ownership and ROA is 
insignificant, which leads to the rejection of the 
third hypothesis of the first model. Conversely, 
the foreign board membership in the second mod-
el demonstrates the positive impact of monitoring 
on improving the firm’s operating performance 
by increasing the ROA. This is consistent with 
Douma et al. (2006), indicating that the positive 
effect of FBM on both firm value and operating 
performance based on the ability of foreign inves-
tors as board members to monitor the managerial 
action and impose pressure to improve manager 
performance (Phung & Vy Le, 2013).
Control variables: firm size and age appear to 
have a substantial positive impact on TQ at 1 % 
significant level in all regression models, while 
only firm size has a positive impact on ROA. It 
is 5% significant level in all regressions, except 
the model in Panel A of Table 4, whereby the sig-
nificant level decreased to 10%. Larger and older 
firms have a higher firm value and better operat-
ing performance as they can generate more prof-
it by using better technology and more diversi-
fied sources, and by applying better management 
strategies. This argument is based on the out-
comes of Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) and con-
firms the relevance of the inclusion for the control 
variables.
3.5.2. Foreign ownership and dividend payment: 
fifth hypothesis
The results reveal a negative relationship between 
foreign ownership and the amount of dividend 
payment measured by DY; this leads to the accept-
ance for the fifth hypothesis in both first and sec-
ond models. The result is consistent with Chiang 
and Kuo (2006). There are two possible reasons for 
the negative impact of foreign ownership on div-
idend payment. As discussed in section 2, foreign 
investors prefer firms that pay lower dividends to 
avoid tax expenses as they face a tradeoff decision 
between dividend return and capital gain return. 
Regarding the tax advantage of capital gain, for-
eign investors do not prefer to receive any divi-
dend. This argument is based on the studies con-
ducted by Chiang and Kuo (2006) and Dahlquist 
and Robertson (2001) and concurs with the find-
ings of our research. This may be because foreign 
investor as a board member plays a monitoring 
role in imposing a negative impact on dividend 
payment, which leads to lower DY. The second po-
tential rationale for this negative relation based on 
the outcomes of Durnev and Kim (2005). They ar-
gue that the negative impact of foreign investors is 
attributed to the preference to invest in a growth 
stock.
Consequently, foreign investors prefer firms to 
retain their earnings instead of distributing div-
idends to increase the firm’s growth opportunity 
and maintain high capital gain. The positive and 
robust relationship between foreign ownership 
and TQ support this argument. Kang and Stulz 
(1997) argue that growth opportunity reflected 
in a firm’s market valuation, which is TQ in our 
study. Thus, our results are consistent with the ex-
isting literature and provide additional evidence 
to the value relevance of foreign investment using 
another emerging market data.
Control variables: firm size and firm age appear 
to have a positive impact on DY at 5% signifi-
cance level for all regression models; thereby in-
dicating that larger and older firms can distribute 
more earnings as they can generate more profit 
(Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010). Moreover, this co-
incides with the fundamental concepts indicating 
that when old firms reach maturity, they are better 
able to distribute dividends and confirms the val-
ue relevance of featuring the two control variables 
in both models.
3.5.3. Foreign ownership and stock market 
liquidity: fourth hypothesis
The empirical results of this study support the 
negative perspective of the relationship between 
foreign ownership and stock market liquidity 
measured by TR. This leads to the acceptance of 
the fourth hypothesis for both models. Based on 
the earlier discussion in section 2, there are two 
potential explanations for this based on Rhee and 
Wang (2009), Lesmond (2005) and Amihud (2002):
• first, from an agency theory perspective, the 
existence of foreign ownership increases the 
level of information asymmetry, which im-
poses a negative impact on stock market li-
quidity reflecting in decreasing the TR;
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• second, foreign investors apply a buy and hold 
strategy as long-term investors. This impos-
es an adverse effect on stock market liquidity 
by reducing the frequency of trading volume; 
thus, the trade becomes less active and, conse-
quently, the TR decreases.
Control variables: firm size has a significant posi-
tive impact on stock market liquidity measured by 
TR at 1 % significant level. This result is consist-
ent with Amihud’s (2002) study, which indicates a 
positive relation between firm size and stock mar-
ket liquidity; firm size is a proxy for the publicly 
available information about the stock. Conversely, 
the results demonstrate an inverse relationship 
between firm age and TR, because the younger 
firms are more liquid than older firms. This result 
is consistent with Dey (2005), whose study reveals 
that firm size and firm age are the most critical 
determinants of TR.
3.5.4. Foreign ownership and leverage: second 
hypothesis
As mentioned in section 2, most studies indicate 
a negative relationship between foreign ownership 
and LEV. While we adopted the counter view in 
assuming the relationship is positive, the results 
of the current study are mixed. In the first model, 
results highlight an insignificant relationship be-
tween foreign ownership and LEV, which leads to 
the rejection of the second hypothesis for the first 
model. Whereas, the results for the second mod-
el that based on foreign board membership reveal 
the positive impact of foreign board member on 
LEV at a 10% significance level. Thus, the second 
hypothesis of the second model is accepted at 90% 
confidence level. The latter outcome, hypothesis 2 
for the second model, is consistent with the study 
of Phung and Vy Le (2013), who argue that, from 
an information asymmetry perspective, foreign 
investors suffer more from information asym-
metry than local investors. Therefore, they tend 
to force firms to use more debt as an alternative 
monitoring mechanism.
Control variables: firm size has a significant 
positive impact on LEV, since larger firms place 
greater reliance on external sources of funds to 
finance the firm project. This outcome is consist-
ent with the study conducted by Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2010).
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTION FOR FUTURE STUDIES
This study’s critical outcomes have proven that the existence of foreign ownership improves the quality 
of corporate governance by increasing the growth opportunity. Consequently, this study recommends 
that Jordanian companies welcome even small improvements in the implementation of corporate gov-
ernance at firm level. This can be achieved by encouraging foreign investment and being more aware of 
the benefits of the monitoring role it can provide. The study considers that ASE is an emerging market 
with less investor’s protection law, higher ownership concentration, and have higher market manipu-
lation practices (Cumming et al., 2001; LaPorta et al., 1998; LaPorta et al., 2006). Therefore, adopting 
better corporate governance in crucial to rebalance these weaknesses within the legal environment.
Concerning agency problems, this study recommends investigating the relationship between foreign 
ownership and the level of information asymmetry in Jordan. We recommend a comparative anal-
ysis among local and foreign investors to capture whether they are more or less informed about the 
firms. This would provide an essential guideline since the overall evidence in studies conducted previ-
ously by Kang and Stulz (1997), and Dahlquist and Robertson (2001) is consistent with the argument 
that the information asymmetry may be a driving force behind the bias that exists in foreign holdings. 
Furthermore, we recommend more future research to explore in more details the nationality and iden-
tity of foreign investors as equity owners, this to help researchers conducting further investigation into 
foreign ownership. However, to enable such future studies, ASE must enforce transparent disclosure 
policies to ask companies to provide more information about foreign ownership to achieve a more com-
prehensive understanding of this vital topic. Meanwhile, considering the effort during the London initi-
ative (2019) gathering, the study expects to have an impact on practice by demonstrating a range of ev-
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idence related to the potential benefits of forming investment and the existence of foreign members on 
the board of the Jordanian companies. To our knowledge, this study is the first to address the potential 
impact of foreign investments and the existence of foreign membership. We expect the Jordanian au-
thorities to consider opening the door to more foreign board members in light of this study’s outcomes 
and the impact on practice. Finally, extending the study to cover other countries in MENA region and 
its duration is anticipated to reveal more critical outcomes that help practitioners in the whole region 
and enhance the market efficiency in the capital markets of the region. Moreover, it will help enhance 
transparency to encourage more investment in the region, as it is expected to reflect positively on the 
business environment of the region.
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